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How Capital Taxes Harm
Economic Growth:
Britain Versus the United States
Lee E. Ohanian*
To finance expenditures on goods and ser-
vices and government programs, governments
levy taxes on many different economic activi-
ties. Large countries tend to raise much of their
revenue by taxing income. For example, in the
United States, taxes are levied on capital income,
such as profits and interest, and also on labor
income, such as wages and salaries.
Taxes on income affect economic activity,
since they change the incentives individuals
and enterprises have to produce, consume,
save, and invest. Taxes on capital income have
potentially important implications for economic
growth, since they change the incentives to ac-
cumulate capital goods. For example, increas-
ing taxes on capital income reduces the rate of
return  to capital investment. A decline in the rate
of return may lead to less investment and, con-
sequently, slower growth in a nation’s stock of
productive capital. Slower growth in the stock
of capital means fewer new factories, office
buildings, computers, and other types of equip-
ment and structures available to produce out-
put, which can lead to slower economic growth.
This argument suggests that an important
factor in setting capital taxes is the sensitivity
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of investment to capital taxation. If  investment
is  insensitive to capital taxation, taxing capital
will not affect the capital stock or economic
growth appreciably. If investment is sensitive to
capital taxation, however, even relatively mod-
est taxation may reduce economic growth con-
siderably. While most economists agree that
increasing capital taxes will lead to reduced
investment, there is no consensus on how large
that effect might be.
This article uses historical differences in capi-
tal income taxation between the United King-
dom and the United States to help shed light
on how capital income taxes harm economic
growth. Over much of the postwar period, capi-
tal income taxes in the United Kingdom were
much higher than those in the United States.
The genesis of this difference lies in the policies
these countries used to finance World War II.
Following the advice of the influential British
economist John Maynard Keynes, the United
Kingdom increased income taxes, particularly
those on capital income, significantly during
World War II. While some of the same senti-
ments that helped Keynes persuade the United
Kingdom to raise taxes were also present in the
United States, the increase in U.S. taxes during
the war was small relative to the increase in the
United Kingdom.
The differences in capital income taxation in
these countries during the war and the post-
war period provide a natural experiment that
can be used to evaluate the economic conse-
quences of capital income taxation. To gain an
understanding of how capital income taxes af-
fect economic growth, this article discusses the
qualitative mechanisms underlying the possible
growth effects of taxes, contrasts the economic
performance of the United States and the
United Kingdom over the postwar period, and
uses differences in taxation to interpret the dif-
ferences in economic performance between the
countries after the war.
This article also discusses the evolution of
war-finance policies in the two countries. Al-
though the United States and the United King-
dom ultimately used very different policies to
finance World War II, I argue that during the
1940s—and even into the 1950s—the United
States came close to adopting the type of poli-
cies used by the United Kingdom. Thus, if not
for stubborn U.S. lawmakers who were unwill-
ing to adopt President Roosevelt’s recommen-
dations, tax policies—and perhaps economic
performance—in the United States may have
been very similar to the British experience.
1
TAX SMOOTHING AND WAR FINANCE
One of the most important questions that
confront government policymakers is: how
should wars be financed? Wars are times of
national emergency and often require enor-
mous increases in government expenditures. As
a result, wars are periods in which output needs
to be high, so economic inefficiencies associated
with a poorly designed tax system could be very
costly during these episodes.  The economic
inefficiency created by a tax is the extent to
which taxation causes a decline in the level of
the taxed economic activity. For example, high
taxation of capital income reduces the incen-
tive to invest, since it reduces the rate of return.
Similarly, high taxation of labor income reduces
the incentive to work, since it reduces aftertax
wages. By reducing the level of economic ac-
tivity, taxes prevent mutually beneficial trades
that would otherwise have taken place and
thereby make all parties who would have ei-
ther bought or sold that good or service worse
off.
How can a government raise revenue to fi-
nance the war effort while at the same time
keeping economic inefficiency low? Two aspects
of war can influence the design of tax policies
1 This article draws from earlier work of mine, includ-
ing “The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the
United States: World War II and the Korean War,” and “Post-
war British Economic Growth and the Legacy of Keynes,”
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that minimize economic inefficiencies: the level
of government expenditures and the duration
of the war. During wars, substantial resources
are transferred from households to government.
Thus, as the level of government expenditures
rises during wars, fewer goods are available for
private consumption. This specific outcome is
referred to as the income effect of taxation, since
the transfer of resources from households to the
government through taxation effectively re-
duces household income. To compensate for
this loss of income, households tend to work
harder and produce more goods and services.
The duration of a war also plays an impor-
tant role. The shorter the war, the more likely
households and firms will try to avoid taxes by
substituting nontaxed activities, such as leisure,
for taxed ones, such as labor. This is called the
substitution effect of taxation. The size of the sub-
stitution effect is a key factor in determining
the economic inefficiency of a tax. If the substi-
tution effect is large, taxes can lead to a signifi-
cant decline in the taxed activity and a big in-
crease in economic inefficiency. For example,
suppose income tax rates were very high for
only one day. In this case, we would expect
households and firms to avoid temporarily high
taxes by reducing work and production on that
day. As a result, tax revenue on that day may
be low, despite high tax rates.
A number of economists have studied the
effects of these two factors on the design of ef-
ficient plans for war finance. The best known
work in this area is by Robert Barro, who ar-
gues that to minimize economic inefficiency,
wars should be financed primarily by govern-
ment debt and that the debt should be gradu-
ally paid off after the war. This policy is known
as tax smoothing.
To understand how tax smoothing works,
consider the alternative policy:  financing a war
while maintaining a balanced budget. The key
feature of a balanced-budget policy is that no
debt is issued to pay for government expendi-
tures. Since expenditures are high during wars,
taxes would need to be raised substantially to
ensure that expenditures do not exceed rev-
enues.  However, high tax rates will lead to sig-
nificant economic inefficiency unless the sub-
stitution effect is small. Recall that the size of
the substitution effect will depend in an impor-
tant way on the expected duration of the war.
In particular, if the war is expected to be short,
the substitution effect will be very high because
individuals can avoid temporarily high income
taxes by working less, changing their consump-
tion behavior, and using savings to help finance
their expenditures during the short period in
which taxes are high. If the war is expected to
last many years, however, it becomes much
more difficult for individuals to avoid taxes, and
thus the substitution effect will tend to be
smaller.
Based on the duration of most major U.S.
wars, Barro has argued that it is reasonable to
expect that the substitution effect will be large
during these episodes. Given the presumption
of large substitution effects, Barro’s analysis
suggests using government debt to pay for most
war expenditures. This policy leaves the effi-
ciency of the tax system roughly unchanged
during a war and does not reduce incentives to
produce. After the war is over, taxes are raised
slightly to gradually retire the debt. This tax
increase after a war does not increase economic
inefficiency much, since the increase is fairly
small and is long-lasting. The benefit of financ-
ing wars with government debt is that debt can
be used to smooth out tax distortions over time,
leading to a better outcome than the alterna-
tive of having very high inefficiencies for a short
period.
HISTORICAL TAX POLICIES IN THE U.K.
AND THE U.S.
Historically, tax policies in the United King-
dom and the United States have been charac-
terized by tax smoothing. Robert Barro and oth-
ers have argued that U.K. wars prior to World
War II were financed primarily by debt, and that20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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wartime debt was paid off gradually after the
specific war. For example, Cooley and Ohanian
(1997) report that about 70 percent of U.K. gov-
ernment expenditures during World War I were
financed by debt, and this percentage appears
to be even higher for many earlier wars.
During World War II, however, there was a
sharp change in the type of war finance poli-
cies used in the United Kingdom. Britain largely
abandoned its historical policy of tax smooth-
ing in favor of a policy designed to finance as
much of the war as possible from contempora-
neous taxation. This departure from the stan-
dard policy was due to the influence of John
Maynard Keynes, one of the best known econo-
mists of the 20th century.
2
Keynes was strongly opposed to the use of
debt to finance war expenditures. Keynes op-
posed deficit financing because of the difficul-
ties faced by several countries in repaying debts
after World War I and also because government
debt was owned primarily by wealthy house-
holds. Keynes thought that wars should be pe-
riods of sacrifice and not a time when the
wealthy benefited by earning interest on war
bonds. Instead, Keynes favored a balanced-
budget policy, in which tax revenue was suffi-
cient to finance government expenditures and
no debt was required to finance the war effort.
Keynes detailed his opposition to the stan-
dard practice of tax-smoothing policies and
constructed a specific alternative plan to finance
the war in his monograph How to Pay for the
War: A Radical Proposal to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Keynes’s objective was to pay for the
war without using deficit financing. Keynes’s
interest in maintaining a balanced budget dur-
ing wartime differed sharply from the modern
theory of war finance developed by Barro and
others. However, Keynes had additional moti-
vations in favoring a policy of higher taxes over
a tax-smoothing one. He recommended not
only that taxes be raised substantially to finance
the war but also that wealthy households ex-
clusively should bear the burden of these taxes.
In Keynes’s view, economic inequality in Brit-
ain was too high, and his plan to finance the
war effectively redistributed income from
wealthy households to poor ones.
But such a plan would not raise sufficient
revenue unless it also involved taxing the in-
come of households at all income levels.
Keynes’s solution to this problem was to pro-
pose a system of sharply rising levies on all in-
comes in excess of a small minimum, with the
highest incomes paying a marginal rate of 85
percent. For nonwealthy households, these lev-
ies were to be regarded as compulsory savings,
credited to a savings institution of the
individual’s choice, that would be rebated with
interest beginning in the first postwar recession.
The rebates were to be financed by a wealth tax
that would begin following the war.
3 Keynes
also had hoped that the wealth tax would be-
come a permanent part of the U.K. tax code.
How a wealth tax affects investment depends
on whether households expect the tax. If house-
holds expect that their assets will be taxed in
the future, the expected rate of return to invest-
ment will decline, and investment will fall.
Some economists recognized this potential
problem with the Keynes plan and criticized
this component. Sir John Hicks, another lead-
ing British economist of the period, argued that
the imposition of a wealth tax would lead to
high economic inefficiencies, as wealthy house-
holds altered their behavior to try to avoid the
tax. Although Keynes understood the logic of
this argument, he claimed that households
would not change their behavior significantly
in response to a future wealth tax. 2 Keynes’s book The General Theory of Employment, In-
terest, and Money, published in 1936, was a widely used text
in graduate economics education for much of the postwar
period.
3 A wealth tax is a levy based on the value of household
assets.How Capital Taxes Harm Economic Growth: Britain Versus the United States Lee E. Ohanian
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Keynes also worked hard to persuade Brit-
ish Treasury officials that his proposals should
replace the standard war finance policy of tax
smoothing. Some government officials viewed
the proposals advanced in How to Pay for the
War skeptically. The Treasury initially rejected
the proposals, fearing that higher taxes might
jeopardize the increased level of production
required for the war effort. However, Keynes
was ultimately able to persuade the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer that his plan was superior
to the conventional type of war financing.
Consequently, Keynes heavily influenced the
1941 budget statement. The budget contained
most of the tax changes Keynes had advocated,
including sharp increases in income taxes—a
standard rate of 50 percent and a top marginal
rate of 97.5 percent. The United Kingdom did
not adopt the large compulsory savings pro-
gram that had been a key factor of the Keynes
plan. Instead, the budget included a very mod-
est compulsory savings plan that promised re-
bates of a small portion of the taxes at the end
of the war.
The adoption of these policies changed the
aftertax income distribution considerably in the
United Kingdom. For
example, in 1938, the
top 289,000 households
had an average aftertax
income of nearly 2000
pounds. By 1949, only
the top 11,000 house-
holds had an average
aftertax (inflation-ad-
justed) income of that
magnitude, a decline of
96 percent in the num-
ber of households at
that net income level.
4
Despite these sharp
increases in taxes, the
United Kingdom still needed to issue debt to
help finance World War II. Thomas Cooley and
Lee Ohanian report that about 60 percent of
expenditures were financed with tax revenue,
and just under 40 percent were financed with
debt.
The United States also has traditionally fi-
nanced wars with tax-smoothing policies. For
example, before World War II, the United States
fought six wars financed with a mixture of di-
rect taxes, debt, and seignorage.
5  Claudia
Goldin has documented the relative importance
of these different sources of revenue (Table).
These statistics suggest that, with the exception
of the Spanish-American War, the United States
financed the six wars prior to World War II pri-
marily with debt.
6
During World War II, a greater fraction of
5 Seignorage is the revenue the government receives by
printing new money.
6 It should be noted that Goldin does not distinguish
between debt finance and seignorage and that the United
States made considerable use of seignorage during the
Revolutionary War.
TABLE
War Financing in the United States
Percent of expenditures Percent of expenditures
financed by financed by debt
direct taxes and seignorage
Revolutionary War 13.1 86.9
War of 1812 21.0 79.0
Mexican War 41.8 58.2
Civil War - Union 9.3 90.7
Civil War - Confederacy 13.0 87.0
Spanish-American War 66.0 34.0
World War I 24.0 76.0
World War II 41.0 59.0
Korean War 100.0   0.0
Source: Claudia Goldin, 1980, pp. 938-940.
4 See Cooley and Ohanian
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U.S. war expenditures was financed by direct
taxation (though still a far smaller fraction than
in the United Kingdom). This is broadly con-
sistent with Barro’s idea, since the war was rela-
tively long, and expenditures were high. How-
ever, as noted by Paul Studenski and Herman
Kroos (1963), a number of government officials,
including President Roosevelt and Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau, pushed for even
higher taxes. As military expenditures began to
rise in 1941, Morgenthau urged Congress to fi-
nance at least two-thirds of defense purchases
with taxes, recommending high taxes on capi-
tal income.
7
By 1942, President Roosevelt also believed
that the war should be financed with higher
taxes. He fought  for a substantial tax increase
and proposed a ceiling of $25,000 on aftertax
household incomes.
8 Moreover, he recom-
mended that Congress consider a forced sav-
ings plan similar to that designed by Keynes.
Although Congress did raise taxes during
World War II, it did not implement the draco-
nian changes recommended by the President
and his Cabinet. After Roosevelt’s budget mes-
sage of 1944, in which he chastised Congress
for failing to adopt his recommendations, Sena-
tor Walter George, chairman of the Finance
Committee, stated “We have reached about the
bottom of the barrel as far as existing taxes are
concerned.”
9
The administration and Congress continued
to clash over tax policy during 1944 and 1945,
but Congress continued to oppose Roosevelt’s
recommendations, and taxes were raised only
modestly over the balance of the war. Thus,
while Roosevelt’s views on war finance were
similar to those of Keynes, and may have even
been shaped by Keynes, he was not nearly as
successful in influencing tax policy during
World War II.
Even after World War II, support for bal-
anced-budget policies remained high in the
United States. President Truman was a staunch
believer in maintaining balanced budgets.
Studenski and Kroos note that Truman continu-
ously urged Congress “...to finance the great-
est possible amount by taxation,” and that he
“...hoped to maintain a balanced budget, even
if military costs doubled.”
10 Truman felt that the
policy of using debt to finance World War II was
a mistake: “During World War II we borrowed
too much and did not tax enough.”
11  President
Truman was much more successful than Presi-
dent Roosevelt in persuading Congress to raise
taxes in wartime: Goldin estimates that the en-
tire Korean War was financed with taxes on la-
bor and capital income.
U.S. AND U.K. MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
At the outbreak of World War II, the macro-
economic performance of the United States and
that of the United Kingdom were similar in sev-
eral ways: both were wealthy countries and
both had relatively skilled labor forces. In ad-
dition, both faced similar patterns in the de-
mands that war placed on their economies. For
example, between 1939 and 1944, inflation-ad-
justed expenditures of the central government
in the United Kingdom rose by a factor of about
8; over that same period, inflation-adjusted ex-
penditures of the federal government in the
United States rose by a factor of about 9.
Despite the similarity between the increases
in government expenditures in these two coun-
tries, their macroeconomic performance was
7 See Studenski and Kroos, page 438.
8 This recommendation implies a 100 percent marginal
tax rate on high income households.
9 See Studenski and Kroos, page 449.
10 See Studenski and Kroos, page 490.
11 See Studenski and Kroos, page 490.How Capital Taxes Harm Economic Growth: Britain Versus the United States Lee E. Ohanian
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strikingly different (Figure 1).
12 There are sev-
eral important differences in the behavior of
output in the two countries. A large gap in out-
put between the two countries emerged dur-
ing this period. The gap grew considerably
during the war, and narrowed afterward as U.S.
output of military equipment and supplies fell.
The gap also widened somewhat in the 1950s.
Between 1939 and 1959, real output per capita
in the United Kingdom grew at an average rate
of 1.5 percent per year, while that in the United
States grew at the rate of nearly 3 percent per
year.
The output picture in the two countries
changed considerably, however, after the war
(Figure 1).  The gap between the two countries
continued to develop as the United States grew
faster in the early 1960s, but this gap narrowed
by the end of the decade. Moreover, from the
1970s on, growth rates in the two countries were
very similar as U.S. output and U.K. output
moved almost in lockstep.
Similar differences between the United States
and the United Kingdom are seen in the behav-
ior of private business investment in plant and
equipment. The United States experienced a
sharp drop in business investment spending
during the war, which reflects the fact that not
many goods were available for private use. As
a result, individuals chose to consume a rising
share of the smaller amount of goods, rather
than forgo additional consumption and invest.
In the U. K., investment  also dropped steadily
throughout the war (Figure 2).
12 Output in both countries is measured relative to its
1939 level.
FIGURE 1
Real Per Capita Output: U.S. and U.K.
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After the war, however, sharp differences in
the behavior of investment arose between the
two countries. In the United States, investment
rose quickly, from around 4 percent to about 16
percent of GNP, and fluctuated around that
value over the rest of the postwar period. In
the United Kingdom, however, private invest-
ment rose modestly after the war, from about 3
percent at the end of the war to about 7 percent
a year later. However, private investment in the
United Kingdom continued to rise gradually
over the postwar period, and by 1980, the rate
of investment in the United Kingdom was simi-
lar to that in the United States.
These data indicate that the United Kingdom
grew at a much slower rate during World War
II and for the first half of the postwar period. In
addition, the period of slow output growth co-
incided with a period of low investment and
low growth in the capital stock. What are the
reasons for this particular pattern of macroeco-
nomic performance in the United Kingdom?  In
particular, are there any simple explanations
consistent with both the poor early performance
and the improved performance later?
While many factors can affect economic per-
formance, I highlight one simple difference be-
tween these two countries that is consistent with
the different early and late postwar macroeco-
nomic behavior: large differences in taxation of
capital income.
Figure 3 provides a measure of the average
tax rate on capital income.





Average Capital Tax Rate:
1940-80
13 Economists often distinguish between gross and net
capital income. Gross capital income is total capital income,
and net capital income is gross income less the value of
depreciated capital.
Source: Cooley and Ohanian (1997). Source: Cooley and Ohanian (1997).How Capital Taxes Harm Economic Growth: Britain Versus the United States Lee E. Ohanian
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striking aspect of Figure 3 is that capital tax rates
in the United Kingdom during World War II and
the early postwar period are substantially
higher than those in the United States. For ex-
ample, capital tax rates in the United Kingdom
approach 50 percent at the peak of the war,
which is double the U.S. tax rate of 25 percent.
Note also that capital tax rates in the United
Kingdom decline consistently over the course
of the postwar period, from the peak of 50 per-
cent in 1946 to about 17 percent by 1980. Thus,
the data in Figure 3 indicate that the very high
rates of capital income taxation put in place at
Keynes’s recommendation during the war re-
mained in place in the early postwar period and
were only gradually reversed. In the United
States, the capital income tax rate declines
quickly from 25 percent at the peak of the war
to about 15 percent by 1950. Although the tax
rate increased during the Korean War (1950-53),
it declined modestly over the post-Korean War
period, to about 12 percent.
The very different pattern of these tax rates,
along with the basic theory of how changes in
capital tax rates can affect investment, has im-
portant implications for macroeconomic perfor-
mance in the United Kingdom and the United
States. First, the differences in investment be-
tween these two countries immediately after the
war suggest that investment is quite sensitive
to capital income taxation. In 1946, capital in-
come taxes in the United Kingdom were about
twice as high as those in the United States, and
the rate of investment in the United Kingdom
was only about one-third the rate in the United
States. My interpretation of this difference is
that high capital taxes led households to sub-
stitute lower taxed activities for saving and in-
vestment.
A look at both the behavior of capital taxes
and the investment rate over the entire post-
war period sheds further light on the effects of
capital taxes. In the United Kingdom, the steady
decline in the rate of capital income taxation
from 50 percent to about 15 percent resulted in
a significant increase in the rate of return to in-
vestment. This is consistent with the smooth
increase in the investment rate in the United
Kingdom over the postwar period. As the rate
of return gradually rose, the rate of investment
increased, reflecting the higher aftertax reward
to investing.
In the United States, the capital tax rate de-
clined from 15 percent immediately after the
Korean War to about 12 percent by 1980. Since
the capital tax rate did not change much over
this period, basic theory predicts that the in-
vestment rate should also not change much.
This is consistent with the steady investment
rate in the United States over the postwar pe-
riod.
The historical differences in capital income
taxation between these two countries account
for these three distinctive features: (1) the enor-
mous difference in the rate of investment be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United
States at the end of the war, (2) the steady rate
of investment in the United States over the post-
war period, and (3) the persistent increase in
the rate of investment in the United Kingdom
over the postwar period. The main implication
for economic growth is that the low rate of in-
vestment during the early postwar period in
the United Kingdom led to slower growth in
the capital stock. This observation can help to
account for the low growth rate of U.K. output
during the immediate postwar period.
By the early 1960s, the investment rate in the
United Kingdom had caught up to the invest-
ment rate in the United States, resulting in a
pickup in growth in the U.K.’s capital stock.
This catching up also helps explain the fact that
the growth rates for output in the United King-
dom and the United States were virtually the
same after the mid-1960s. But for the United
Kingdom, the period of slow growth in the
1940s and 1950s left the level of real per capita
output persistently lower than that in the
United States.26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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CONCLUSION
Historical differences in capital income taxa-
tion and the investment rate between the United
Kingdom and the United States suggest that
investment in capital goods is sensitive to taxa-
tion of capital income. This analysis concludes
that large increases in capital income taxation,
such as the increase that occurred in the United
Kingdom during World War II, can lead to
sharp declines in investment and future eco-
nomic growth.
The United Kingdom followed the recom-
mendations of John Maynard Keynes in sub-
stantially increasing capital income taxes to fi-
nance the war. In Keynes’s day, a common view
in economics was that investment was not very
sensitive to capital income taxation. This view
suggests that financing the war with high capi-
tal taxes would not affect investment or eco-
nomic growth very much and thus helps ex-
plain Keynes’s recommendations.
But further analysis suggests that this view
was wrong and implies that Britain would have
had a significantly higher standard of living had
a tax-smoothing policy been used to finance
World War II. Moreover, Britain might have
been much worse off had it adopted all of
Keynes’s recommendations, which included a
permanent wealth tax. Although that policy
may have furthered Keynes’s objective of re-
ducing economic inequality, it’s likely that in-
vestment and growth would have been even
lower over the postwar period.
As in Britain, there was considerable pres-
sure to increase taxes in the United States dur-
ing World War II. In fact, President Roosevelt’s
views on war finance were quite similar to those
of Keynes: both argued against debt finance, felt
that the war should be financed by high-income
households, and viewed a forced savings policy
as a potentially important component of war
finance. However, unlike their British counter-
parts, lawmakers in the United States were not
persuaded by these arguments and instead fi-
nanced the war primarily through issuing debt,
much as previous wars had been financed.
Even though Congress did follow President
Truman’s recommendations for higher taxes to
finance the Korean War, the relatively low level
of military expenditures during that war did
not require huge increases in  tax rates. In re-
cent work, I have found that the economic inef-
ficiency of following a balanced-budget policy
during the Korean War rather than a tax-
smoothing policy was about 0.5 percent of real
GNP per year. However, had the United States
used a balanced-budget policy during World
War II,  economic inefficiency could have been
as high as 5 percent of real GNP per year
(Ohanian, 1997). This suggests that the United
States was fortunate to have resisted pressure
to raise taxes substantially during World War
II. Otherwise, postwar economic performance
in the United States may been much more like
that of the United Kingdom.How Capital Taxes Harm Economic Growth: Britain Versus the United States Lee E. Ohanian
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